

Immigration: The Blockage of Mobility in the Mediterranean Basin *

by
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Introduction

Beginning in 1974, almost simultaneously, all of the major countries of Western Europe, which had been using large quantities of immigrant labor, suspended and then completely blocked the inflow of permanent workers from the Mediterranean Basin.(1) Despite the continuance of now illegal immigration, and the beginning of immigration within countries hitherto noted for emigration (Italy), this blockage represented a considerable change with respect to the period which began in 1946 with the great population movements that followed the rearrangements of national borders after the Second World War.

It is obvious that the interpretation of this recent change can not be separated from two important processes: 1) a questioning, beginning in 1971-73(2) of the type of Post-WWII relationship which had been obtained between the center and the periphery of capitalist development, and as a result of the international division of labor;(3) 2) a questioning, within the French social formation, of a kind of economic development dependent on massive immigration.

The few points that we propose to illustrate briefly are the following:

1. The approach to the problems of the international division of labor (IDL) can be most fruitfully formulated by displacing the problem to that of the *international division of labor power*. Within this framework, the question of mobility and immigration can serve as a guide. At any rate this is what is actually happening.

2. Contrary to common opinion, the control of mobility began well before 1974; this control appeared only as a logical move and not as the consequence of an exogenous economic phenomenon (the crisis); the control was exercised against both the movement of first-time migrants and the ghettos of migrant population. *It was primarily the growing impossibility to control this second variable, that is to say the reproduction of the immigrant working class, which explains, both within France and Europe as a whole, the decision to block mobility in 1974.* The examination of migration policies show this.

3. A new analysis of the labor market: we find the neoclassical models which had dominated French planning replaced by conceptual instruments focused on the mobility of labor,(4) a replacement which illustrates the new point of view of capital vis-à-vis both the problem of industrial restructuring and the diverse, relatively autonomous sectors of that which is still called the labor market. The example of migration and of the functioning of the labor market give us some insight.

4. This point of view is not applicable to immigration alone but must also be extended to emigration. The disequilibrating effects of the migration of manpower in the Mediterranean Basin have been stronger than the counter-tendencies which they have produced. It is a fundamental element of the present crisis of capitalist command in Europe, as can be seen by: a) the internal dynamics of the countries dominated by imperialism; b) the changes in institutional and monetary policies designed to respond to this crisis; c) the proletarian pressure which maintains, despite the diverse attempts at limitation, the *circulation of struggles*, a continual tension which forms an obstacle to development programs and to a new cycle of rising profits.

I. The Hidden Face of the New International Division of Labor: the New International Division of Labor Power.

According to common opinion, which results most often from reading the specialized literature on immigration,(5) the recent changes in policy and in migration movements in countries reproducing and exporting labor power and in countries consuming imported labor power, are explained by all those factors usually cited in attacks on the model of capitalist development fundamental to the period of expansion since the Marshall Plan and the Korean war (a model based on the relatively low price of primary products, such as energy, as well as on the relative abundance of manpower).

The crisis of interstate or interbloc relations is read either through an essentially economic framework (crisis of overaccumulation in the center, inadequate markets due to relative underconsumption in the periphery,

mechanical drop in the rate of profit, limitations on investments, the international monetary crisis), or in a "political" framework which emphasizes the avatars (transformation and not necessarily the decline) of American imperialism with secondary imperialisms, with the socialist bloc, under its triple aspect: military, economic and monetary domination.

Without undertaking here a critique of these two views, which pursue between themselves a fascinating dialogue of the deaf, or which are artificially reconciled,(6) we will remark only that in both cases movements of manpower are integrated only as simple complements or consequences. The "critical" viewpoints which are based on the study of an (abundant) academic literature concerning the international division of labor and which try to interpret the political significance of the crisis of imperialism and of the theory of imperialism, base themselves in general on the modifications in the labor process (technological jumps, microeconomic approaches, "internationalization" of production) or on modifications in the process of circulation (fluctuations in investments, monetary sanctions, effective demand, composition and structure of the commodity form, terms of exchange).

Hence their difficulties in trying to reconstruct what they split apart in their very approach, especially when this split is itself a part of the strategies of the new efforts at control. An example is given to us by the famous question of the development of technology. Two policies concerning this question are possible: 1) contracts "product-in-hand" (and not simply turnkey contracts) and 2) the "disaggregation of technological packages." (7) Their joint application today by all the countries of the Third World may seem contradictory, as long as the analysis does not come back to the question of social relations which are also production relations. It is, effectively, *the same crisis* of control of the labor force which leads Third World countries to refuse to buy simple abstract production capacities independently of the techniques of control (and not simply those of training) of manpower (from 'keys' to 'product' in the hand) and to purchase techniques which include the organization of production, (especially assembly line production). And, on the other hand, to refuse the "technological package" when its internal coherence requires social relations which are only compatible with the forms of political reproduction of labor power typical of capitalist growth in the metropolis. *Small is beautiful*, (8) or the adaptation of the technological package to the social conditions of the importing country expresses this refusal of large industries and their inherent revolutionary character.

In short, a reunified approach to the problems of the international division of labor can be based neither on the production process abstractly reduced to the labor process (independently of the State form and of the money form), nor on the valorization process also abstractly reduced to the circular realization of the commodity form (durable/nondurable goods, means of production on which the development of various sectors depends) through different types of monetary flows.

One must analyze the transition from the former to the latter if one is to grasp the valorization process as it is currently developing. This can only be attempted and successfully carried out if the question of the new I.D.L. is redefined in terms of new international division of labor power. This would be the only way to take up the question of the "alliances of the class and not the alliances of classes" from a new angle.

This methodological question seems to lead us far away from the problem of migrations. But if we admit that these constitute a particular *form* of circulation, of movement of labor power and of articulation of the I.D.L., then the 1974 mutation (an institutional shift) not only constitutes an essential factor of the "new international conditions", it can also provide the guiding element of *an analysis which is based on the movements of labor power to explain those of capital and not the reverse*. (9)

It has been said in particular that the migration movements in Western Europe stopped as a logical consequence of the oil crisis and of the 1974 recession.(10) This sequence is false. Although they occurred simultaneously, it is absurd to hold that the former is a result of the latter. In fact, this change resulted from the articulation of the two terms on which for years the balance of power between the classes, specifically as it exists at the level of the production relation worldwide, was based. Just as there is a specificity of the organisms of capitalist power (and of socialist, by the way)(11) at the level of this very production relation worldwide.

II. Migration Policies in Western Europe.

An examination of these policies shows that the interruption and subsequent blockage of immigration were but a follow-up of a trend which had started earlier, i.e., as early as the late sixties (end of 1968 in the case of France). This modification occurs at two levels. First, we see an *increasing homogenization of the legal stipulations regulating the entrance of first-time migrants*. But beyond these details,(12) instructive as they might be, we observe that these steps, because their final purpose is to create a segmentation of the labor market, segmentation which is either temporary (for migrant X) or permanent (if migrant X is replaced by migrant Y, as is the case in times of high flows), have led to a more or less similar situation in F.R.G., Switzerland, France, Belgium,

Sweden, Austria and Great Britain.(13) Three phases are characteristic of the active life and the geographical and professional mobility the migrant is allowed:

a) During the introductory year, (which can be prolonged by various means, as in the case of clandestine immigration when legalization is refused, or when the contract is terminated before the expiration date), the mobility of the migrant must be *controlled*, i.e., reported. (Beginning in 1968, French authorities start talking about the exceptional nature of the legalization process, thus aligning themselves with the F.R.G.); the work permit (not immediately renewable) tends to settle the worker in the same work, in the same area, and above all in the same sector (agricultural/industrial).

b) During the 3 to 4 years after obtaining a work permit in France or the equivalent somewhere else, mobility between firms is no longer limited, but professional and geographical limitations remain.(14)

c) Beyond that, the worker obtains a permanent working permit*. Noneconomic limitations (by which is meant "legal" obstacles to the exercise of a profession, or to a displacement not resulting from a "social" inequality e.g., from education) are relaxed in the field of *intra-industrial*, geographical and professional mobility. However two limitations remain which prohibit a total conquest of freedom by the workers. On the one hand, the worker is still not a citizen, and this formal inequality inhibits his participation in organizations and coalitions (see the regulation of the right of assembly in France).(15) The permanent working permit and the residential permit are only valid for about 10 years. On the other hand and more important, the working permit is automatically granted only to *waged* workers. Unwaged positions, in particular service jobs, are subject to authorization.(16)

This type of general regulation, which results in a threefold division of the migrant labor market has continually been challenged by two factors:

- The weight of inherited gains in countries like France and Great Britain, where immigration was not restricted during the colonial period (unlike the F.R.G., Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria).
- The acceleration of European integration; particularly in 1958, when the main supplier of labor power, Italy, obtained freedom of circulation for its citizens.

For segmenting their active labor force England, France and Belgium gradually adopted the German model based on the experience gained from the integration of the refugees from East Germany in the 50s. (It must be remembered that in Germany, the big push for massive immigration came with the construction of the Berlin wall!) This implied that these countries had to go back on previous privileges granted to British citizens (Black British)(17) and former French citizens (Algerians and Black Africans). The change started in 1968 with the Franco-Algerian agreement and the 1st British law. It escalated in 1971 with the English Immigration Act and the Fontanet-Marcellin *circulaire* in France in 1972. At another level, the tendency to a homogenization of European labor power is accompanied by the appearance of regulations aimed at the immigrant population in general (focusing essentially on family reunions and expenditure linked to the increasing stabilization of a foreign community). This process of homogenization naturally started in France that had the longest history of allogamous migrating populations. (This was not the case of Britain until the sixties).

Thus homogenization extends to the regulation of work itself and no longer just access to work, with the extension of social security benefits, retirement, unemployment compensations, etc. From then on it affects directly the formation of the immigrant community. *Two stages can be distinguished in the ensuing migration policies.* Two types of control regulations followed each other and partly overlapped. From 1969 to 1972, migration policies of Western European States consisted mainly in modifying and readjusting the conditions of entry of permanent immigrants. From 1972 to 1978, management of the immigrant population became the primary focus, and this even before the closure of 1974.

One could be led to think that once new immigration has been stopped, it becomes natural to turn to policies concerning existing immigrant populations. Reality is different. As early as 1969, when there was a renewed strength in the migratory flow, the French government started a control of entrances and initiated a program for the elimination of slums, which led to the destruction of the largest shanty town in Europe, that of Portuguese workers in Champigny. It is then that the government started to concern itself with the social aspect of immigration.(18) In effect, for the individual employer, this was a situation of unlimited labor supply, in which hiring n workers cost no more than n times the cost of one worker. But with the very rapid increase of the foreign population, social costs escalated (and always under the pressure of social struggles such as rent strikes and other forms of struggle specific to immigrants.) In the future loomed the prospect of even larger expenditures. The essential discrimination against the first-time migrant or the ordinary immigrant does not concern the direct wage they receive but rather concerns the indirect wage including benefits for children's education. The various measures were taken, including a doubling of the tax on firms by the French State for hiring foreign workers and for the construction of immigrant housing, were evidence that a large part of these migrations which at first had been presented as temporary were now seen as more permanent. (OECD).

The frequency of periodical trips home could reinforce the image of immigrants as *Gastarbeiter* (guest-workers). But the behavior of the immigrant labor force during the deep conjunctural recession of 1967 in West Germany and its ramifications in France made apparent that: 1) the return home of immigrant workers acted as a cushion, a buffer for unemployment. Everybody saw that. And 2), the labor force of the Mediterranean Basin was a permanent and a structural part of the labor markets of Northern Europe, which indicated that the immigrants were only *temporarily* leaving; that turned out to be the case, but it was not so easy to see.(19)

In Western Europe, even before the termination of immigration, the FRG adopted a program of family allowances and later of family reunion modeled on the French system. The still limited but new initiation of a policy of naturalizations in Germany is evidence of a tendency to gradually eliminate the differences between the different legislations.

Following a phase of liberalization of the migration flows which corresponded exactly to a deep industrial restructuring(20) and was based on the belief that sectoral adjustments of the labor force were spontaneous, an attempt was made in developed countries as early as 1969 to channel first-time migrants more effectively. "Uncontrolled mobility" of labor still exists as evidenced by intersectoral labor transfers, in particular from agriculture to industry through seasonal work(21) and from industry to the tertiary sector through regularized work and after 1974,(22) through "clandestine" work.

The end of migration flows of permanent workers only confirms a policy already contained in the famous Fontanet-Marcellin *circulaires*.

It will be noticed that obstacles to a very strict control of the labor market increase as the stocks of immigrant populations grow. Problems then arise concerning the reproduction of the working class, which is inseparable from the reproduction of labor power as soon as the latter no longer takes place exclusively abroad.(23)

What about the apparent specificity of French migration policy? i.e., its "laissez-faire" policy? It is true that there are some differences between the French and the German systems of entry. The French system, closer to the British, did not have the rigid sectoral channeling of labor power characteristic of the German system. For two reasons: 1) because she inherited the colonial situation, on the one hand, France had sources of labor supply which were not available to competing recruiting countries, but toward which France had certain obligations and which constituted obstacles to an effective control of the flows;(24) on the other hand, in areas where competition was effective, France which had a disadvantage relative to Germany -- and this accounts for the fact that the most combative and thus the most qualified(25) among the migrants headed toward FRG and Holland(26) -- compensated by practicing a more flexible social control.

Yet the conditions of admission of migrants who had to hold contracts specifying the nature of the job and the wage did not generally correspond to the needs of the productive apparatus. In an era of high technological change, constant restructuring of industry necessitated a pool of labor for the increasing number of unskilled jobs that industry created. In France (and Belgium) these needs were met through "regularizations" of illegal immigrants, in Sweden and Germany through high temporary turnovers and in England, through intersectoral labor movements toward the service industry. What was needed was not fixed contracts and individual qualifications,(27) but a certain *social* fluidity of immigrant labor power, a qualitative plasticity(28) which must constantly readjust to the changing organic composition of capital.(29) We must avoid mechanical and catastrophic formulations.(30) Rigidity was simply nonfunctional. The nonrigidity of the labor market is the real form of capitalist productivity. The ability to control unskilled work measures the degree of social exploitation. And the gap between this system of control over the skills of the labor force and the "de-skilling" of the labor force is, one might say, the same as the gap between absolute surplus value and relative surplus value. The systematic lack of correspondence between the official skill level of immigrant labor and their actual jobs merely helps to unveil what is true in general for the labor force in the capitalist production process.(31)

Thus, immigrant labor stimulated technological innovation and induced productivity gains.(32) But the induced side effects of this desired mobility and of this *laissez-faire* were the multiplication of intersectoral movements of the labor force and of factors of "global slippage of wages"(33) vis à vis the country of origin. The migrants remain linked to their homelands not only by remittances and visits but also by exporting consumption patterns and certain social needs as well, (e.g. a direct wage, transfer payments from the State). These are the consumption patterns and needs regularly denounced by the apostles of esthetic socialism and heavy industry (repeating the Marcusean critique of the integration of the working class developed in the capitalist center during the 1960s).(34) This circulation of needs -- historically determined following Marx, but biased upward geopolitically -- goes far to explain the growing demand for "development" being expressed by the Group of 77.

Thus, the lack of control(35) over the mobility of labor power was not the only cause for the closure of 1974; there were two other factors.

1) increased political disequilibrium generated by the circulation of the proletariat in the Mediterranean Basin.

2) on the level of control over the labor market, the increasing size of the immigrant population in Western Europe created a situation where this "Third World concentrated in the factories" of the center made a control of the labor market through the mere regulation of entrances increasingly difficult.

Emigration from the countries of origin built on itself⁽³⁶⁾ as families regrouped, destroying the reproduction base for the labor force in those countries.⁽³⁷⁾ At the same time with access to the labor market of the wives and second generation immigrants, there was an endogenous growth of the migrant population which more and more invalidated the mechanism of segmentation on which the control of mobility was based.

III. From Migration Policy to the Critique of its Political Economy.

The theory of "unlimited supplies" of labor,⁽³⁸⁾ which gives us a first correct approximation of the conditions of utilization of immigrant labor since the mid-1950s and in the 1960s posits that the flows of labor are regulated by the demand and in the case of unskilled, undifferentiated labor, defines its malleability by its low cost. Thus labor migration is reduced to a permanent and continually renewed flow of first-time migrants. This does not account for:

-- the stock effect, important because it is the result of the fixation of the migrant worker -- an effect which is more accentuated in France than elsewhere;⁽³⁹⁾

-- the renewal of the sources of labor power; the successive migration waves differed in the nationality represented;

-- the evolution of the migrant worker: skill levels and availability. Migrant paths are not identical, there are discontinuities, "segmentations," which criteria such as age, marital status, duration of stay, and nationality are not sufficient to pin down.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The migrants' behavior depends both on the conditions which make adjustment possible in the receiving country and on the changes affecting the possibilities to escape wage-slavery in the country of origin.

Thus, in this multinational space defined by the migratory flows, which cannot be reduced to the ordered pair country-of-origin/receiving-country but which founds the Mediterranean whole, migrants are no longer those mere elements of a preexisting supply, this pool of manipulated "scabs" used against the indigenous working class which is then taken as a standard of measurement. One must take into account the qualitative reversal produced by their increased number which gives them a central character in the productive role of work. Not only must we reject the thesis of the productive as well as political "marginality" of the migrant,⁽⁴¹⁾ we must also reject its inevitable complement: the idea of the immigrant worker as a pure passive victim of unequal development in the capitalist world. Such vision reduces the Third World to a mere producer of labor power and the immigrant worker to a Gulagian-type exile, at worst a half-wit led by the nose and chasing mirages; all these images are sterile, better yet the old fashioned analysis based on *homo economicus* : the rational calculator.

The availability of immigrant workers is the result of a long history. The migrant worker weighs his wage not against that of the free Western worker but against his income of origin. The migratory channel which each migrant follows is rich in information which allows him to evaluate fairly accurately the conditions in the receiving country. One must reject the old image of the migrant worker unable to understand his paycheck in favor of a very acute worker's consciousness of the material conditions of exploitation, of the possibilities of wealth. The weaknesses of the multinational working class have too often been imputed by the traditional organizations of the workers' movement to an "insufficient level of consciousness", or to an "absence of factory organization" (while in fact the immigrants often have circuits of community solidarity that capitalism has destroyed among French workers). These weaknesses are in fact often linked to obstacles of a juridical order: a lack of freedom in the labor market, limits *in fact* and *by law* on formal organizations, on meetings, etc.

The immigrants wages are often more rigid downwards than those of the migrant from Brittany or Correze. The mobility of the international worker is a way of looking for the most favorable conditions of class confrontation, a further development of the internal mobility which he had already used in his country of origin.

The constitutive expansion of capital is but the response to this irreversible pressing need which shall be realized no matter what. The progress made by the first generation migrant is in general out of proportion with the average advance of the French worker throughout his existence, and even more so with that which awaits the second generation migrant. Hence the conflict of generations among migrants. The children can't effect such a spectacular leap forward: the giant strides of the proletariat yield to the cautious small steps of the working class. The refusal of the workers' condition by the second generations is the refusal of this marking of time.⁽⁴²⁾

The traditional economic analysis used to explain migratory phenomena is disappointing because it is loaded with political prejudices. The recent progress of the concrete analysis of labor markets, mobility and unemployment in France(43) provides a more promising framework which will return to the analysis of migration its productive and political dimensions in their time dynamics. The study of the determinants of employment and unemployment in France through the cycles of accumulation starting in the early 1950s, i.e., through the expansion phase of industrial labor and the consequent need for migrant work has led to a redefinition of unemployment as the result of the global confrontation of two stocks -- namely the supply of and demand for labor seen as homogeneous and independent entities and of their adjustment to the withdrawal of the active population.

The new element which neoclassical adjustment models fail to explain and which has become a number one problem is the *simultaneous* progress of both industrial employment and of unemployment since 1965. This spawned new needs for more accurate information on the mechanisms of distribution/renewal of labor power. The mobility of labor became a central issue and an approach in terms of labor flows was substituted for one in terms of labor stocks. More specifically, the discontinuities in the process of adjustment, and the behavioral irreversibilities ("ratchet effect") which were analyzed reverse the supply/demand hierarchy, replacing it with a labor market structured by the creation/elimination of jobs, themselves decomposed by sector (industrial jobs, service jobs) and checked against the statute: active/inactive job seeker. This grid brings out behavioral job rigidities and opposes them to the conjunctural fluctuations of entry/exit behavior in the labor market. This takes account of the inflexibility of women's labor supply and of the demand for money income. At the same time, one must reevaluate the importance of immigrant movements, even though new paradoxes may arise.

Immigrant labor in its structure is revealing of the composition of the indigenous labor force: to the large rural-urban migrations of the late 1950s accompanied by the maintenance and consolidation of family farming, corresponds the massive progress of seasonal migrant labor in agriculture; to the indigenous workers running away from industrial jobs and rushing toward white collar jobs, corresponds the increasing use of permanent immigrants who, starting in 1956, arrived in successive waves regulated by economic cycles;(44) the flight from waged work was compensated by the extraordinarily compact character of the immigrant group, containing 95% waged workers, and 80% blue collar during the whole period.

However, this dialectics of emptying and filling the labor market presents certain subtleties which require a reversal of the analysis: the dynamics of immigrant labor mobility, of its extension and diffusion does not automatically flow into the holes of a locally depressed supply of labor, it has its own springboard from which it operates, its own "egotistical class interest" even if the latter is limited, harnessed and channeled within the rigid limitations of regulations. (The immigrant becoming working class foreshadows the passage of women in the same steps.) These facts force us to invert again our understanding of confrontation, of the functions attributed to the various segments of the labor force, of their unity, of the segments of the labor market itself, as well as of the obsolete role of unemployment in this framework. The movements of creation/elimination and geographical redistribution of jobs (i.e., regional decentralization and international relocation which are capitalist initiatives), industrial concentrations and redeployments represent the capitalist perspective of this movement. It reaffirms the priority for capital to decompose the working class.

The ideological point of view has been forced to define perfect flexibility of labor -- whether the supply and withdrawal of labor in the traditional theory or the job fluctuations designed by sectoral restructurations in the new INSEE(45) theory -- negatively as being rigidity. But *this must be changed into a positive analysis of the strength of the class as the determinant and reference point of the movements of capital*. There is no other determinant, unless one turns to "intercapitalist competition" believing that the sordid internal family quarrels of capital can serve as the motor of history?

IV. Emigration and Disequilibrium.

The "disturbing" and not strictly "re-equilibrating" effects of international migration (including those in the reproduction of unequal development standards which maintain the existing balance of power) were openly recognized fairly early on in the official reports of international organizations such as the OECD, the EEC, and the ILD.(46) The decision of no-return has become a permanent feature of the migratory chain and has speeded up family reunions -- resulting in the disappearance of a double productive role by fake "single" migrants who actually continued to support their families in the country of origin. This phenomenon was linked to an increasing regional disequilibrium(47) which did not necessarily mean increased underdevelopment in general, but rather development without development, i.e., access to money and consumer goods through the transfer of funds(48) without the parallel development of local industrial capitalist production. The reports of international organizations disclose that

the main problem became the impossibility of channeling the savings of migrants toward industrial capital and the creation of jobs.

The symptoms of a migration which is increasingly difficult to control are well known: the increase of money circulation, of durable consumer goods, tend to worsen balance of payments deficits and to fuel inflation which is no doubt higher in the countries of origin than in the center -- this given the absence of self-regulating and compensating mechanisms that exist at all levels in developed capitalist societies. (The social effects of inflation are also more discontinuous, more brutal and less expected in the source countries.) Another effect is the flight by local wage workers from industrial jobs in their countries of origin (if one has to be a blue collar worker, better to be one where wages are higher) together with the growth of white collar jobs, which not only constitute a parasitical rent but is the political price of social stability.

Agricultural production has declined relatively and sometimes even absolutely as a result of this rural exodus and emigration. The position of peasants was reinforced; they could more successfully resist productivity increases and wage (or indirect) dependence. In a parallel fashion the changing consumption patterns of the urban proletariat (especially the increased demand for meat, protein, and vegetables) accentuated the lack of qualitative correspondence between the goods supplied by traditional agriculture (long biased toward agri-industrial production) and demand. The growing deficit of the agricultural balance of payments in Mediterranean countries became a continuous problem from 1970 on. Obviously, immigrant workers on vacation in their homelands brought with them new consumption habits.

In the countries of the periphery as in the center, a relative overpopulation will tend to maintain low wages. In the periphery the extent to which this relative overpopulation functions as an "industrial reserve army" has been reduced due to the correcting effect of immigration and the very complex segmentations within the labor market.(49) A number of sectoral development projects and "take-off" strategies have failed, not for lack of capital but because of an insufficient domestic demand. This is a weakness which is not entirely explained by the low level of wages of actively waged or potentially waged workers. As in the center, the unemployed population is never an undifferentiated supply of labor, the proletarianized population of the large urban centers is not merely a pool of labor upon which firms can draw freely. The initial political problem of "development" is precisely that labor power is not constituted in a labor market. It is not broken to the industrial discipline" hence not necessarily subsumed under the production relations of large scale industry; hence the demand for it is not independent of the conditions of politico-institutional equilibrium.(50)

1. The Blockage of Mobility and Political Disequilibrium.

Has the end of emigration been able to stop the disequilibriums created by the large migratory waves of the 1960s?

It seems that it has not. That the social and economic transformation of the countries supplying labor power are irreversible is attested to by the exceptionally widespread geopolitical consequences of the blocked mobility. In 1974, the war over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey;(51) 1975, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal;(52) 1976-77, the "green march" on the Spanish Sahara, Algerian Moroccan tension and the beginning of the Sahraui problem;(53) 1977, the Italian events, i.e., insurrection of the "marginalized" secondary labor market;(54) 1978, Tunis riot whose protagonists are the new working class in the factory, which is born out of the multinational subsidiary textile and clothing shops. At the same time in the streets, the young proletariat is unable to emigrate for three years.

Massive returns, an exogenous factor, cannot be the main cause of this imbalance (except maybe in Italy and Spain). The limited degree of return could not explain the magnitude of the crisis which rocked the whole Mediterranean Basin, especially if one includes, in addition, the problems which arose in Israel, in Egypt, in Syria and in Lebanon as a result of the circulation of Palestinian struggles.

2. New Forms of Imperialist Control

At this point, the question is: what new political orientation will be initiated to function within the context of the limitations of international labor mobility? *Moderate growth* in the center; *moderate growth* in the new poles of development, *this is the new unifying principle* for the new international division of labor, for the spatial redefinition of activity.

From massive immigration the system passes to the elimination of banal waged work in the new development pockets, first as a way to end the increasing social costs of an immigrant labor force that was beginning

to eat away the benefits of its services, and second, as a way of responding to the increasingly urgent Third World demand to establish a new balance in the distribution of productive zones. This new configuration which displaces entire segments of production in search of a low wage labor force, poses a new crucial problem at its peak: that of the indestructible link between production and social conditions. The end of migratory flows does not result in a more serene era. The extension of the factory to the Third World produces its rioting proletariat well beyond the limits of the firm. This we have already said. But repression which takes the form of slow growth, of a slow increase of the waged labor force, of strengthening traditional structures, of a limited protectionism noncontradictory with GATT, is not uniform and does not limit itself within a general principle.

It is a fact that such supranational institutions as the IMF carry out a centralized multinational command function, but the possibility of a uniform constraint with its purely economic mechanisms has failed. The floating exchange rate policy which was to function mechanically to bring about international alignment has failed because of the rigidity of national public spending responsible for the balance of payments deficits; the "locomotive" theory of the economic revival advocated by the Carter Administration failed in favor of the national management of the work force. The pulverized unity is reconstituted, delineating new international regions and blocks of countries. Spain and Portugal, once linked to the common market, re-negotiated their debt -- after the trying experience with the IMF -- within the context of the Community which becomes the locus where industrial strategies are defined. The relation State/multi-national company is upside down, the latter must accept a social dialectic dictated by the national space. Former keys to external deficits: unemployment and inflation, are replaced by the progression of the money supply and the wage bill in this new productive phase.

The chronological history of the phases of Post-WWII world economic development was structured by specific and unified institutional forms: an administrative logic dominated by the Americans until the end of the 1950s, and a policy of migration control. Both declined because of their inability to absorb the renewed expansion and speed up of investments which resulted in economic tensions and imbalances this institutional framework found impossible to resolve. Social transformations, breaks in economic behavior, new relations to the wage to an income, to work, were already initiated and would provide the key to the ensuing stronger expansion.

The new era which opens starts with strict stabilization measures to obtain the reduction of workers' demand for more consumption, disciplining through financial reform programs, in particular public finances, readjustment of national profit levels (parity adjustments) and domestic income redistribution (rebuilding profits through a monetary attack against wages) under the control of international organizations (e.g. OECD, IMF). The new international framework -- which includes free exchange, convertibility, capital exports, internationalization of production standards (a market logic extended to migration policy that takes on the form of beneficial spontaneous migration) -- gives a push to the expansion of national economies which are linked to the dynamism of a world market that guarantees the international distribution of production by breaking national controls.

The *world market* as international production -- international mobility of capital and labor -- develops the conflicts to such a level of generalization that we can find therein an explanation of the real nature, of the depth, of the length and of the redefinitions implied by the crisis. These redefinitions present the contradictory characteristics of a renaissance of multinational control mechanisms (IMF) and, at the same time, a consolidation of States at the national level in favor of productive restructuring and increased social control. For example, in Italy we see the IMF legitimizing the government by displacing the political space of social regulation -- such as the Bank of Italy from American to government control. We have gone from clearly set out Draconian conditions to the direct justification of brutal economic policies.

Contradictions appear between regional bloc policies (Europe, Mediterranean Basin, Africa) and local projects of industrial development, of protectionist policies, and of an intense international decolonialization of production. This limited protectionism facilitates the managing at the national level of the social effects of basic changes, not to block them completely but to slow them down and defuse any possible explosive consequences.

But the most characteristic aspect of the new policies, the most universal, is the new importance being assigned to the "micro-physics" of the labor market.

These "micro-physics" have become the point of departure for all definitions of those projects of deconstruction or of production based on both subsuming and compartmentalizing local forces. The new industrial projects are not reducible to local analyses of employment; they provoke decisive overall effects on economic aggregates, especially on public expenditures. But the policy of reducing public expenditure, the first phase of the international crisis which seems to be drawing to a close as the only means to attack the working class, has not been able to measure the productivity of public expenditures and thus to make of them a positive weapon; the State has only identified, circumscribed, and calculated the general contours of the class situation. It has thus blocked its extension.

It has, in so far as what interests us here, rigidified immigrant labor and ghettoized it with a system of financial help for leaving the country. The rationality of this measure (ineffective as a financial incentive mechanism) must be sought behind the racist effect of the campaign against the "million foreigners" and the rapid spread of police repression. It does not have as an effect the massive outmigration of unemployed immigrants, rather it tends to threaten and to shape the productive behavior of those involved in "black work" or working illegally in small workshops. The micro-physics of the labor market takes on, for immigrant labor, the double form of a regionalization of employment (which defines industrial policy at the level of local markets and subordinates public spending to the employment of French workers (Monory declaration in 1977) and an active urban policy of quotas against concentrations of immigrant ghettos. These mechanisms can be integrated into a more active policy of outmigration based on a more detailed knowledge of migration channels and into the policy of blocking immigration in order to recuperate and capitalize that policy by linking it to the development in source countries of small industrial projects.(55)

3. Yesterday and Today

The historical experience of the 1924 cutoff of transoceanic migration to the United States reveals that this was done for reasons essentially internal to the class relations of that country.(56) The ideology of the degradation of working conditions served to mask the operations of substitution used by American capital (the creation of a new secondary labor market made up of Blacks, women, and youth).

In Western Europe today, the cutoff of immigration has occurred within a similar dynamic. In France, such forms of labor market segmentation that began around 1969 appear to have been forms of substitution having for protagonists immigrant women, second generation migrants, colonial Blacks and extensive sectors of young workers. The sizeable extension of new models of work (part-time, black work, and temporary work) are outlining the new segmentations of the years to come.(57)-

Nevertheless, the essential difference between the earlier American experience and the present French experience, is the rapidity with which these alternative solutions to immigration have been invaded by powerful class struggles, including and especially in the dominated areas. Proletarian pressure, which has never let up in the Third World countries, poses an obstacle to the attempted massive devalorization of the elements entering into the reproduction of the multinational working class. As to whether a New Deal could be created to readjust the institutional system of the center, there is one essential condition lacking: the agreement of the most advanced capitalist sectors. The hour has not yet come for "priming the pump", it is rather the moment of first restoring acceptable profit margins.

* Translated by Harry Cleaver and Danielle Jaussaud.

¹This blockage of international labor power mobility -- other than an historical example to which we will return at the end of this essay -- can also be found in the Caribbean Basin which supplies labor power to the USA, Canada and Brazil. In the United States in particular the problem takes the form of undocumented immigration (Mexicans, Jamaicans, Haitians, Colombians, etc.) which may include up to 20 million persons, which is to say some 10% of the active population [Ed. note: recent studies have put such high INS derived figures into question -- see Flores article.]. The question of the "closing of borders" has become, parallel to the question of "welfare reform", one of the key problems of the new administration.

We will also note that the third great pole of attraction of labor power, South Africa, is also experiencing considerable problems. The many wars of Southern Africa, are disrupting flows in that area.

²1971: the inconvertibility of the dollar: 1973: the "oil" crisis.

³See the abundant literature on "redeployment" and restructuring of the European productive apparatus in the context of the entry of new Third World countries into the world market of manufactured goods (Berthelot Report, *Les Changements Des Economies Du Tier-Monde et L'Appareil Productif Francais*, especially the appendix, January 1978, xerox).

⁴See the work of R. Sallais at INSEE.

⁵Along with such special issues on immigration as *L'Annee Sociologique* (1977), *Ethnologie Francaise* (1978), *Autrement* (1978), *Politique Aujourd'hui* (March-April 1975), one can consult *Hommes et Migrations*, *L'Algerien en Europe*, (the BELC Press Review), *Presse et Immigres*, (the journal of CIEMM -- Centre d'information et d'etude sur les migrations mediterraneennes). On international migration in general see: *International Migration Review*, *Studi e Migrazione*, etc.

⁶See on these problems: Luciano Ferrari Bravo, "Vecchie e Nuove Questioni nella teoria dell'imperialismo," in *Imperialismo e classe Operaio Multinationale*, Feltrinelli, 1975.

⁷The factory "product in hand": the contract concerns not only the productive capacity of the factory (turnkey), but also on the actual output. The "technological package" is the package of processes, licenses, and patents which make up the know-how involved.

⁸On the significance of the emergence of the small enterprise and of the effective transformation of production into the "diffused factory" see *Quaderni Del Territorio*, no. 4/5, Milan, 1978. [Ed.note: *Small is Beautiful* refers to the book by that name authored by Schumacher which praises small scale, labor intensive technology.

⁹See on the general methodology, Mario Tronti, *Ouvriers et Capital*, Christian Bourgois, 1977, and on the question of immigration *L'Operaio Multinazionale in Europa*, Feltrinelli, 1974.

¹⁰The classic link: "The link between immigration and economic activity of the receiving country, if it is certain and complex, can not be grasped by a simple mathematical model: it varies according to the phases of accumulation of capital and with the appearance of crises of overaccumulation ... We have distinguished three phases, the last still in gestation: first, an emerging immigration which follows the fluctuations of the labor market. Then, this immigration, because of specific conditions of integration (sectors, wages) associated with its quantitative increase, tends to become complementary to French workers and to become detached to some degree from the labor market and its evolution. Finally, a third phase where immigration again becomes absolutely dependent on economic activity and on the labor market under the pressure of unemployment created by the crisis of overaccumulation. We are entering in 1974 in the downturn of a long cycle of accumulation." Christian Mercier, *Les Deracines du Capital*, Lyon, 1977, p. 171.

¹¹We can note in passing that the only two things that have been internationalized during the last 15 years allow a non-reified definition of the "internationalization of production" or, more exactly, of the relations of production. These are *money*, and *labor power*. The true symmetrical counterpart of the Eurodollar is not the mass consumption good (present well before 1963) it is the Euroimmigrant. And it is likely that the impact of this immigration on the productive processes of the source countries, as in their receiving countries, has been a disequilibrium, a deconstruction and a recomposition of the social and political fabric at least as extensive as the impact of the Eurodollar on the restructuring of the multinational corporations.

¹²It should be unnecessary to detail the gains made by the ex-colonial populations: Algeria for France, Pakistan and the Antilles for Britain.

¹³See on this point the already perceptible situation in 1973, S. Castles and G. Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, 1973.

¹⁴See box on immigration laws.

¹⁵On this question at the European level see C. Withold de Wenden, *Les Immigres dans la Cité*, Paris, 1978.

¹⁶In France, for example, this outline, already at work in the Decree of June 5, 1946, was again adopted in the Decree of November 21, 1975; what the immigrants gained, as it was inevitable after the closing of the flows, was that the permanent C card became valid for all waged professions instead of only for one.

¹⁷On the question of the black British and on immigration to the United Kingdom, in French, one can consult the contribution of Y. Charbit in *Annee Sociologique*, op. cit.

¹⁸See the Corentin Calvez report to the Conseil Economique et Social, (J. O. des 25 et 26 fevrier 1969).

¹⁹See M. Drain and Poinard, *Les Retours Conjoncturels de Travailleurs Migrants*, under the direction of B. Kayser, OECD, 1970.

²⁰See *La Fresque Historique du Systeme Productif Francais* de INSEE; we can compare this period to that of 1896-1910 in the United States; see P. Carpignano, "Immigrazione et Degradazione," in *La Formazione Dell' Operaio Massa Negli USA, 1898/1922*, Feltrinelli, 1976.

²¹On this problem which was the cause of the first attempts to track immigrant mobility in France in 1926-1927, see the eloquent material presented by Bonnet in his thesis: *L'Immigration et Les Pouvoirs Publics en France Entre Les Deux Guerres*, Lyon 1976.

²²The thesis that can allow us to reconstruct the function of "racism" and of the law of 1932 in France for the protection of national labor can be drawn from both the experience of the 1930s and from that of the 1970s: racism emerges and functions mainly with respect to immigrants working in services. The racist standard functions as a factor opposed to the intersectoral mobility of immigrant labor into the tertiary sector and toward salaried work associated with a social status and income above that of blue collar workers.

²³Significant with respect to this, was the 1977 polemic between Anciet Le Pors (director of the R.C.B. -- *Immigration et Development Economique et Social*, La Documentation Francaise, 1977) and Fernand Icart, who had directed the S.E.M.A. to do a study on the social costs of migrants for the Commission des Finances in Parlement (see the note of March 18, 1977 by Le Pors). This produced an economic and social accounting full of nuances and very prudent in its conclusions: "Without any doubt, the proportion of social expenditures imputable to immigrants appears to be less than their importance in French society. Of course, on the average these foreigners profit more than the French from social welfare, because they have relatively lower incomes. All in all, taking account of their social-demographic characteristics, they cause less cost in terms of social security, education, and professional training". Against this was proposed a summary evaluation, often inaccurate, which politically was located within a perspective seeking the reduction of public social expenditures and drawing on the most elementary form of racism (comparisons of social groups having totally heterogeneous characteristics). In the F.R.G. the pretext used to justify the cutoff of immigration was also the extremely rapid rate of growth of social expenditures for first-time migrants followed sooner or later by family regrouping.

²⁴Also desired for reasons of demographic policy, always explicitly present in France (see the debate in *Liberation* between I.N.E.D. and the Minister of Labor: Tapinos, "L'Immigration entrangere en France," *Cahiers De INED*, 1971). For a theoretical reconstruction of the class significance of "demographic regulation" see Mariarosa DallaCosta, "Reproduction and Emigration," in *L'Operaio Multinazionale*, Feltrinelli, 1974, [translated in this issue].

²⁵On the link between skill level, wages and the level of counterpower, see Rolle for the theoretical approach. Also the academic literature is very useful; see P. d'Hugues, G. Petit, F. Rerat, "Les Emplois Industriels," *Cahiers du Centre d'Etude sur L'Emploi*, No. 4, PUF, 1973. For an application to the problem of the new skill categories in metallurgy see *Camarades*, No. 4-5, June 1977.

²⁶Opinion is unanimous on this point, see Tapinos, Granotier, *op.cit.* The example of Spain, of Yugoslavia, and of Turkey illustrate this correspondence between the level of development at the center and the level of development in the dominated periphery.

²⁷Rolle has shown, beginning with his *Introduction a La Sociologie du Travail*, (1973) how the individual character of skill level was the necessary and indispensable corollary of the wage class, and of the distribution of individual labor power as commodity of which each person must be formally the owner (and thus responsible for its formation). Rolle also shows that the real functioning of capitalism at the current level of development constantly ignores this principle.

²⁸From this point of view, we must agree with J. -P. de Gaudemar (1976) that the "mobility" of labor power is one of the essential dimensions of the particular use-value of labor power in its consumption. In this way we can reinterpret that element perceived by neoclassical theories of immigration: the marginal flexibility of the productive apparatus (for example: Bobning, *Les Effets De L'Emploi Des Travailleurs Etrangers*, OECD, 1975).

²⁹This hypothesis is precisely illustrated by the period 1896-1910 in the United States, see P. Carpignano, *op.cit.* p. 197.

³⁰We are thinking about the theses on the "de-skilling" of labor power including those of Freyssenet modified by the concept of "overskilled", which are not able to explain the productivity, creativity and qualitative centrality of "de-skilled" labor. What is not being recognized is the average social skill level of whole strata of labor power.

³¹We can compare this mechanism to the essential maladjustment between education and its use in social life. (see Rolle, *op.cit.*) In the case of migration the theoretical question we are posing is this: what is the use-value that remains unabsorbed in the specific case of immigration? (For a similar framework of analysis see Rolle and Tripier "Valeur d'echange et valeur d'usage de la force de travail," in *La Division du Travail*, Galilee, 1978).

³²The idea can be shocking. Has it not been frequently repeated that the facility with which business can procure cheap labor power has undermined the modernization of industry? In fact, the misunderstanding about the role of immigration in the introduction of technical progress and in accumulation is the result of a confusion. The choice of a technological system, thus hence of a certain organic composition of capital, is not decided by itself, according to a "scientific" rationality to which we then add a parasitical capitalist control. The standard of profit, of social control to which we then add a parasitical capitalist control. The standard of profit, of social control remains the guiding principle in these matters. The use of immigration, far from having a breaking effect (except marginally) on technological innovation, has in fact favored a leap forward in all those sectors of rapid accumulation (for example metallurgy between the wars, the BTP since 1965). To speak of technology is to speak of social mobility which is its real price. Without immigration, the social cost of such an "industrial mutation" of France would have been so high as to compromise the rate of profit, it would have resulted in a blockage of development at the center and not in a socialist utopia which would be based on idea work, and high skill levels while ordinary manual labor would be confined to the periphery.

³³Global in the sense of the hierarchy and gaps between sectors and branches of industry remain intact.

³⁴See all the developmentalist literature of the Third World which argues that immigration has liquidated the possibilities of a "model of socialism based on heavy industry". Example: Abadan, "The Non-Return, a permanent characteristic of Turkish emigration," in *Sociologie du Travail*, 1974.

³⁵A lack of control illustrated since 1972 by the immigrant struggles over the rules laid down by the Fontanet-Marcellin Circulaires. This "liberation" struggle, in the absolutely rigorous sense of a conquest of formal freedom to sell to the highest bidder, culminated in 1974 with the vast legalizations made by the Minister of Labor Force faced with a frontal application of this rigid segmentation. The general strike against racism launched by the MTA in 1973 occurred in this precise context. Six months later, immigration was blocked. In Algeria, the principle supplier of immigrant insubordination (from whence the greatest racism against Algerian workers) it is also in 1973 that immigration is cut off. Remember that the movement of immigrants occurred despite the efforts of the Amicale des Algeriens en Europe. From 1975 on followed the phase of illegal or undocumented work punctuated by some legalizations obtained after struggles as patient and difficult as those of Blacks in the U.S. in the last century. Only the closure of new entrants was able to track the flows of of manpower; notably by the barriers created by the authorities between seasonal labor and permanent labor. (For example, after the demonstration by undocumented workers in Montpellier in 1975, the authorities reaffirmed that seasonal workers were uneligible for the benefits of the Circulaires of 1946.)

³⁶This self build-up (or self-nourishment) of immigration by a generalization as arbitrary and casual in the source countries as in the countries of destination -- is one of the fundamental aspects of the "self-valorization" of the working class within the immigrant community which begins to grow beyond the capitalist relation. Beyond capital because capital fails to penetrate and dominate this movement they way it had done for local workers. On the role of the "community" in the lives and struggles of slaves, see the astonishing book by George Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community*, Greenwood Publishing Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1972.

³⁷Even though they use an unsatisfactory problematic -- that of the articulation of different modes of production -- we can find useful material on the essential role of the sphere of reproduction in the functioning of capital in: P. - P. Rey, *Capitalisme Negrier, La Marche des Paysans ver le Proletariat*, Maspero, 1976, and C. Meillassoux, *Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux*, Maspero, 1977.

³⁸W. A. Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of labor, *The Manchester School*, 1954. Note that this theory served for all the strategies of the Caribbean countries supplying large numbers of emigrants.

³⁹Because of the liberal tradition of entry until 1968, the physiognomy of these "economic" migrants was less differentiated from transoceanic migrants than the *Gastarbeiter* of 1960-70 in the FRG.

⁴⁰The statistical analysis of the migration route requires refinements at the actual limits of mathematical statistics: synchronic/diachronic relations, the relation of the characteristics of the migrant to those of the migratory current which structures his behavior.

⁴¹See on this point, the demonstration of the laboratory of the sociology of knowledge of Vincennes: A. Guillerm, Baudouin, Collin, *Les Greves en Europe Occidentale. Femmes et Immigres, Des Travailleurs Marginaux?* 1975.

⁴²During the last conflict at the Flins and Cleon plants of Renault, the role of young immigrants was clearly noticeable.

⁴³See in particular, R. Sallais, "Analysis of the mechanisms determining Unemployment," in *Economie et Statistiques*, No. 93, Oct. 1977.

⁴⁴On this point, J. Singer Kerel, "Economic and Political Conjuncture and French Immigration," Paris-La Haye, 1976.

⁴⁵We can compare this new and more detailed approach to the determinants of unemployment to the new approach to macroeconomic theories of unemployment utilized by E. Malinvaud in *Revue Economique, Emploi et Chomage*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, January 1978: "Much attention is given today to the distribution of primary income; recent profit rates are considered too low to permit a future balanced growth; as a result a fairly firm link is established between the restoration of profits and the possibilities of growth."

⁴⁶See OECD, *The OECD and International Migration*, Paris, 1975.

⁴⁷See Poinard, Roux on Portugal and Yugoslavia; Kayser in general, 1978.

⁴⁸On the general issue: Miurin, *Measures Gouvernementales Pour Attirer L'Epargne des Travailleurs Etrangers et L'Orienter Vers des Investissements Economiques*, OECD, Nov. 1972; also the work of Schiller on the problem in Yugoslavia and Turkey. On France see *Le Comportement de transfer de Fonds des Travailleurs Immigres. Etudes de Huit Nationalites*, FNSP*SEAE, Paris 1977.

⁴⁹Many factors which multiply employment in Third World countries should be perceived as so many forms of barter, there is a real difficulty in installing a wage relation that is transparent and controlled. To earn a "black" income is often to escape permanent factory work which offers only very low wages.

⁵⁰Why not believe the businessmen who are constantly complaining about a lack of the sense of private property in developing countries? But not to conclude that cultural differences explain this, rather to see in this phenomenon a refusal of the wage relation -- a refusal which forces business to use the 19th Century system of barter. We need to rewrite the famous article of Marx on the "theft of wood" that appeared in the *Rheinische Zeitung* by transposing the problem to Kuruna in Nigeria. The wood collected by proletarian families which allowed them to avoid the need for money to pay for heating, and thus allowed them to avoid being waged day laborers has become the "theft" of auto parts between the arrival of shipments from Europe at the airport and their arrival at the factory in Nigeria. [Ed. note: see Peter Linebaugh, "The Theft of Wood, and Working Class Composition: A Contribution to the Current Debate," *Crime and Social Justice*, Fall/Winter 1976.] The whole history of underdevelopment needs to be rewritten. The incredible ferocity of certain punishments (hands cut off for example) measures the level of working class struggle.

⁵¹Remember that Turkey had in 1974 more than a million workers ready to level for FRG. The entry of this country into the common market is stuck on this problem because of the usual free circulation of workers within the community. The easiest countries to admit into the EEC are those whose migratory energies are spent (Greece, Spain ...).

⁵²In the case of Portugal, the role of migratory hemorrhage (one Portuguese worker out of four is in France) in the crisis of the double articulation of the labor market has been large.

⁵³That aspect of the "green march" which concerned the attempt to control the accumulation of the "dangerous classes" has been sufficiently commented upon elsewhere.

⁵⁴Although it probably played only an overdetermined role, the question of the blockage of Italian migration toward Switzerland and the very selective impact of German recession on migration (hitting Italians and Yugoslaves rather than Turks before 1973) have exasperated the tensions.

⁵⁵The OECD has oriented the bulk of its current research toward the practical functioning of these micromechanisms of regional employment, diffused work, etc.

⁵⁶See Carpignano, *op.cit.*

⁵⁷On this question see R. Linhart, "Proces de travail et Division de la class ouvriere"; B. Coriat, "Differentiation et Segmentation de la force de travail dans les industries de process," in *La Division du Travail*, *op.cit.*